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Why The US & India Demonize Pakistan's ISI

Pakistan’s Inter Services Intelligence agency, or ISI as it is popularly known, is seen as their nemesis by those who have tried to undermine the security interests of the country one way or the other. It is no wonder then that in past few years the Americans unleashed a strong ISI-bashing campaign, with India following suit.

The Americans made no bones about their dislike for this agency, blaming it for working against their interests in Afghanistan. The Indians also see an ISI agent behind every rock in Kashmir and in Afghanistan where they are trying to dig their heels. They do not hesitate to pin on ISI the blame for the freedom struggle in Kashmir or for acts of terrorism by Indian extremists. Until recently the Karzai government dominated by the anti-Pakistan Northern Alliance also remained hostile to ISI.

Not too long ago, under intense American pressure the weak Zardari government made an unsuccessful attempt at neutralizing and subduing this agency in disregard to the existing sensitive regional security environment, by moving it out of the army control and placing it under the controversial and embattled Zardari loyalist interior minister - Rehman Malik. This did not succeed for a simple reason. The role of ISI as the eyes and ears of the Pakistan’s military - the bedrock of country’s security, is critical particularly at a time when the country faces multiple threats to its security.

Washington's Darling In The Afghan-Soviet War

Ironically, this is the same ISI that was Washington’s darling during the 1980s when it was master minding the jihad against invading Soviet forces in Afghanistan. The role that ISI then played was congruent with American interests. The defeat of the Soviet Union would have meant realization of an American dream - avenging the humiliation of Vietnam. They held ISI in high esteem for its competence and professionalism and gladly funneled arms and funds to the Afghan mujahedeen through it. The ISI strategized the resistance and organized and trained the mujahedeen fighters, working in close collaboration with the CIA and the mujahedeen leaders, forcing the Soviets to retreat.

But as soon as the Americans had negotiated a quid pro quo - Russian withdrawal from South America in exchange for safe Soviet exit from Afghanistan, they disappeared in the middle of the night leaving Afghanistan in a quandary. The political turmoil that followed created chaos and instability owing to the failure of mujahedeen leadership, presenting as a result a security nightmare for Pakistan.

Taliban-US-Pakistan Relations and The Indian Threat

In this chaos a group of young Afghan religious students, many of them former fighters from the resistance, calling themselves Taliban (in Pushto language Taliban means students), swept through the country with popular support to establish their rule. Interested to keep their presence alive, the Americans maintained contacts and supported them, ignoring their orthodox beliefs, their harsh rule and even the presence of Al Qaeda in their midst. This continued until it was time for the Americans to overthrow their government in order to serve the changing American interests.

While the Taliban government was in control, Pakistan too maintained friendly relations with them in the interest of keeping its western border secure, extending whatever support it could. The ISI played a role through the contacts it had developed during war against the Soviets.

In the wake of 9/11 things began to change. Having invaded Afghanistan in the name of war on terror, branding Taliban as brutes and their resistance as terrorism, the Americans wanted the Pakistan army and the ISI to join the war.

This posed a serious security concern for Pakistan. It could destabilize the Pak-Afghan border and strain relations with the Pashtun tribes on both sides of the Durand Line, the British drawn boundary that cut through the Pashtun region to divide British India and Afghanistan and which Pakistan had inherited. The fact that Pakistan’s border region, called Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) is autonomous where the writ of the Pakistan Government does not prevail made matters more complex.

Pakistan’s military doctrine is based primarily on meeting the main threat from India on its eastern border while maintaining a peaceful border with Afghanistan in the west. A direct conflict with the Taliban would have forced Pakistan to divert its military assets from eastern to the western front, thus thinning out its defenses against India. This was the last thing Pakistan wanted to do because of its unfavorable ratio of 1:4 against India in terms of conventional forces. Understandably, President Musharraf was unwilling to do the American bidding.

U.S. Projection Of Its Military Failures Onto Pakistan

There always is a problem with powers that begin to act in imperialistic fashion. Their vision of the world becomes colored. They tend to believe that pursuit of their imperialist designs takes precedence over the national interests of those who cannot stand up to them, even if that means compromising their own national and security interests. America had also been behaving as one such imperial power and treated its smaller allies more like colonies. President Musharraf was threatened that in case of noncompliance with America’s wishes, “Pakistan would be bombed into the stone-age”. Musharraf was coerced into conceding to American demands.

Despite the state-of-the-art surveillance equipment and military hardware, the US and NATO forces failed to stop the Taliban fighters from moving back and forth into the unmarked Pak-Afghan border that passes through a treacherous mountainous region to regroup and strike on the invading foreign troops. The American commanders reacted by demanding that the Pakistan army engage these fighters and seal the border. Those with even the slightest knowledge of the area would know that the Americans were asking for the moon. This was physically impossible.

Pakistan army’s operations failed. In the process it earned a severe backlash from the local tribes who resented army’s action against their kinsmen from across the border who sought refuge in their area, as it violated the old tribal custom of providing sanctuary to any one who asked for it, even it was an enemy. The Pakistan army paid a heavy price. More soldiers died in this action than the combined number of casualties that the US and NATO troops have suffered in Afghanistan so far.

President Musharraf under advice of his army commanders and the intelligence community called off the action and resorted to persuasion instead. Through jirgas (assembly of tribal elders) effort was made for the tribesmen to voluntarily stop the influx of Taliban fighters. It didn’t succeed either. This was not to the liking of the American commanders. They blamed the ISI for working against their interests.

Washington Accuses The ISI Of Complicity With Insurgents

Washington and the American media frequently alleged that elements within ISI were maintaining contacts with the Taliban and attributed the failure of American troops in combating the Taliban to these contacts. Such allegations were also found to be part of the raw, unverified and even fabricated field reports ‘leaked’ in Afghanistan recently and splashed in the western media. The Americans have in the past also described the ISI to be out of control and demanded of the Pakistan government to purge the agency of Taliban sympathizers.

This is ridiculous. Firstly, ISI is a military organization operating under strict organizational control and discipline where officers are rotated in the normal course. It functions according to a defined mandate, unlike armed forces in some other countries and unlike the CIA which is known to be an invisible government on its own. Above all, Pakistan and its military are committed to weeding out religious extremism as a matter of state policy.

Secondly, if the American troops are so incapable of overcoming a rag tag army of Taliban and if the complicity of ISI with the Taliban can be instrumental in changing the course of the American war, then it is a sad day for America as a super power and the strength of NATO forces becomes questionable.

Thirdly, in the world of intelligence, contacts are kept even with the enemy and at all times. CIA keeps contacts within Russia and other hostile countries. Israel, the great American ally, spies on America itself. It is common for all intelligence agencies to do this in the security interests of their countries. Why then should America expect an exception to be made in case of ISI? Why should contacts that ISI developed with the mujahedeen and the Taliban earlier, and which if it does still maintain, become a source of such great concern for the American administration?

Demanding That The ISI Subordinate Pakistan Security To U.S. Interests.

It is strange that America expects ISI to serve the American agenda instead of Pakistan’s interests first. One cannot forget that the Americans have a long history of abandonment of friends and allies and when they repeat this in Afghanistan citing their own national interest, despite their promises to the contrary, why should Pakistan be expected to be caught with pants down? Why Pakistan’s military and the intelligence agency should be expected to abdicate their duty and not do what is necessary to ensure Pakistan’s security in the long term?

It has often been argued that America expects Pakistan to be actively engaged in the Afghan war in return for the military assistance it provides. The answer is quite simple. The American establishment is doing all that needs to be done in support of its own war and not for the love of Pakistan. The war is theirs, not Pakistan’s. Pakistan should do and is doing what is necessary and feasible, without jeopardizing its own security.

As for the assistance, bulk of the $10 billion that America gave in the past and was branded as “aid” was in fact the reimbursement of expenses that Pakistan had already incurred in supporting the war effort. The rest was to meet Pakistan’s needs for operations in the border areas and for fighting terrorism that arose out of the war. The Americans still owe $35 billion to reimburse the losses Pakistan has incurred due to this war. As for the F16s that Pakistan is getting from the US, it pays for them, despite strict restrictions over their usage.

The Indian-Israeli Attempt To Destabilize Pakistan

While Americans had their issues with ISI, the Indians and Israelis began having their own. The agency exposed the growing Indian and Israeli confluence in Afghanistan to destabilize Pakistan. This happened right under the nose of the Americans and obviously not without their knowledge and consent. India having deployed its troops in the name of infra-structure development in league with Karzai government and with American funding and having established seven consulates along the sparsely populated Pak-Afghan border was engaged in heavily bribing the influential but ignorant and susceptible tribal leaders to spread disaffection among the local tribesmen against Pakistan.

Evidence was also unearthed by ISI about how the Indians bought the loyalties of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), a grouping of Pakistani tribesmen from FATA and Uzbek fighters from previous wars who settled in the region. The TTP were influenced by the same orthodox religious beliefs as the Taliban in Afghanistan and were active in propagating them in their own areas. They were recruited to launch terror activities in the urban centers of Pakistan, including the capital Islamabad, and were funded, trained and equipped in Afghanistan jointly by the Indian, Israeli and Afghan intelligence agencies. A group from amongst them managed to gain control of Swat area adjoining FATA through coercion of the local population, which was later cleared by the Pakistan army after a major surgical intervention.

The ISI also laid bare strong physical evidence of Indian involvement in supporting insurgency in Balochistan by way of funding, training and equipping misguided and disgruntled Baloch elements grouped under various names including the Balochistan Liberation Army that was led by the fugitive grandson of the notable Bugti tribal chief – Akbar Bugti. His comings and goings in the Indian consulate at Kandahar and the Indian intelligence HQ in Delhi were photographed and his communications intercepted. Numerous training camps in the wilderness of Balochistan were detected where Indian trainers imparted training in guerilla warfare and the use of sophisticated weapons, which otherwise could not be available to the Baloch tribesmen. Flow of huge funds from Afghan border areas to the insurgents was detected that was traced back to the Indian consulates.

Summary and Conclusion

The objective of the TTP, and behind the scene that of the Indians and the Israelis, was to make the world believe that Pakistan was under threat of capitulating to terrorist and insurgent elements who were about to take control of Pakistan’s nuclear assets. Their goal: to denuclearize Pakistan through foreign intervention.

These efforts have not succeeded. Undoubtedly, the army and the ISI played a crucial role in foiling the plots of subversion in Balochistan and the Pashtun region and exposing the foreign hands involved, including those of CIA, RAW, Mossad, RAMA and MI6. Terrorism may not yet be eliminated but Pakistan faces no existential threat.

It should be no surprise to the Americans, Indians and the Israelis if they find in ISI an adversary to reckon with. It is also not surprising that the ISI is in their perception, a rogue organization, for it has stood between them and Pakistan’s national security interests. Their frustration and ire, therefore, is understandable.

Hidden Intelligence Operation Behind the Wikileaks Release of "Secret" Documents?

Since the dramatic release of a US military film of a US airborne shooting of unarmed journalists in Iraq, Wiki-Leaks has gained global notoreity and credibility as a daring website that releases sensitive material to the public from whistleblowers within various governments. Their latest “coup” involved alleged leak of thousands of pages of supposedly sensitive documents regarding US informers within the Taliban in Afghanistan and their ties to senior people linked to Pakistan’s ISI military intelligence. The evidence suggests however that far from an honest leak, it is a calculated disinformation to the gain of the US and perhaps Israeli and Indian intelligence and a coverup of the US and Western role in drug trafficking out of Afghanistan.

Since the posting of the Afghan documents some days ago the Obama White House has given the leaks credibility by claiming further leaks pose a threat to US national security. Yet details of the papers reveals little that is sensitive. The one figure most prominently mentioned, General (Retired) Hamid Gul, former head of the Pakistani military intelligence agency, ISI, is the man who during the 1980’s coordinated the CIA-financed Mujahideen guerilla war in Afghanistan against the Soviet regime there. In the latest Wikileaks documents, Gul is accused of regularly meeting Al Qaeda and Taliban leading people and orchestrating suicide attacks on NATO forces in Afghanistan.

The leaked documents also claim that Osama bin Laden, who was reported dead three years ago by the late Pakistan candidate Benazir Bhutto on BBC, was still alive, conveniently keeping the myth alove for the Obama Administration War on Terror at a point when most Americans had forgotten the original reason the Bush Administration allegedly invaded Afghanistan to pursue the Saudi Bin Laden for the 9/11 attacks.

Demonizing Pakistan?

The naming of Gul today as a key liaison to the Afghan “Taliban” forms part of a larger pattern of US and British recent efforts to demonize the current Pakistan regime as a key part of the problems in Afghanistan. Such a demonization greatly boosts the position of recent US military ally, India. Furthermore, Pakistan is the only muslim country possessing atomic weapons. The Israeli Defense Forces and the Israeli Mossad intelligence agency reportedly would very much like to change that. A phoney campaign against the politically outspoken Gul via Wikileaks could be part of that geopolitical effort.

The London Financial Times says Gul’s name appears in about 10 of roughly 180 classified US files that allege Pakistan’s intelligence service supported Afghan militants fighting Nato forces. Gul told the newspaper the US has lost the war in Afghanistan, and that the leak of the documents would help the Obama administration deflect blame by suggesting that Pakistan was responsible. Gul told the paper, “I am a very favourite whipping boy of America. They can’t imagine the Afghans can win wars on their own. It would be an abiding shame that a 74-year-old general living a retired life manipulating the Mujahedeen in Afghanistan results in the defeat of America.”

Notable, in light of the latest Afghan Wikileaks documents, is the spotlight on the 74-year-old Gul. As I wrote in a previous piece, Warum Afghanistan? Teil VI:Washingtons Kriegsstrategie in Zentralasien, published this June on this website, Gul has been outspoken about the role of the US military in smuggling Afghan heroin out of the country via the top-security Manas Air Base in Kyrgyzstan.

As well, in a UPI interview on September 26, 2001, two weeks after the 9-11 attacks, Gul stated, in reply to the question who did Black Sept. 11?, “Mossad and its accomplices. The US spends $40 billion a year on its 11 intelligence agencies. That’s $400 billion in 10 years. Yet the Bush Administration says it was taken by surprise. I don’t believe it. Within 10 minutes of the second twin tower being hit in the World Trade Center CNN said Osama bin Laden had done it. That was a planned piece of disinformation by the real perpetrators…” [i][1] Gul is clearly not well liked in Washington. He claims his request for travel visas to the UK and to the USA have repeatedly been denied. Making Gul into the arch enemy would suit some in Washington nicely.

Who is Julian Assange?

Wikileaks founder and “Editor-in-chief”, Julian Assange, is a mysterious 39-year-old Australian about whom little is known. He has suddenly become a prominent public figure offering to mediate with the White House over the leaks. Following the latest leaks, Assange told Der Spiegel, one of three outlets with which he shared material from the most recent leak, that the documents he had unearthed would “change our perspective on not only the war in Afghanistan, but on all modern wars.”

Yet a closer examination of the public position of Assange on one of the most controversial issues of recent decades, the forces behind the September 11, 2001 attacks on the Pentagon and World Trade Center shows him to be curiously establishment. When the Belfast Telegraph interviewed him on July 19, he stated,

"Any time people with power plan in secret, they are conducting a conspiracy. So there are conspiracies everywhere. There are also crazed conspiracy theories. It's important not to confuse these two...." What about 9/11?: "I'm constantly annoyed that people are distracted by false conspiracies such as 9/11, when all around we provide evidence of real conspiracies, for war or mass financial fraud." What about the Bilderberg Conference?: "That is vaguely conspiratorial, in a networking sense. We have published their meeting notes." [i][2]

That statement from a person who has built a reputation of being anti-establishment is more than notable. First, as thousands of physicists, engineers, military professionals and airline pilots have testified, the idea that 19 barely-trained Arabs armed with box-cutters could divert four US commercial jets and execute the near-impossible strikes on the Twin Towers and Pentagon over a time period of 93 minutes with not one Air Force NORAD military interception, is beyond belief. Precisely who executed the professional attack is a matter for genuine unbiased international inquiry.

Notable for Mr Assange’s blunt denial of any sinister 9/11 conspiracy is the statement in a BBC interview by former US Senator, Bob Graham, who chaired the United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence when it performed its Joint Inquiry into 9/11. Graham told BBC, "I can just state that within 9/11 there are too many secrets, that is information that has not been made available to the public for which there are specific tangible credible answers and that the withholding of those secrets has eroded public confidence in their government as it relates to their own security." BBC narrator: "Senator Graham found that the cover-up led to the heart of the administration." Bob Graham: "I called the White House and talked with Ms. Rice and said, ‘Look, we've been told we're gonna get cooperation in this inquiry, and she said she'd look into it, and nothing happened.’”

Of course, the Bush Administration was able to use the 9/11 attacks to launch its War on Terrorism in Afghanistan and then Iraq, a point Assange conveniently omits.

For his part, General Gul claims that US intelligence orchestrated the Wikileaks on Afghanistan to find a scapegoat, Gul, to blame. Conveniently, as if on cue, British Conservative Prime Minister David Cameron, on a state visit to India, lashed out at the alleged role of Pakistan in supporting Taliban in Afghanistan, conveniently lending further credibility to the Wikileaks story. The real story of Wikileaks has clearly not yet been told.

Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons in Pakistan

The Post Second World War period has witnessed an unprecedented proliferation of lethal and non-lethal weapons. The frequent usage of these sources of human destruction has resulted in hundreds of causalities. Unlike the weapons of Mass Destruction, these weapons constitute the primary instruments of violence in any internal or low-intensity conflict and are responsible for a large number of deaths. They are increasingly being acquired by criminals, cartels and irregular forces and in certain cases by influential citizens and politicians as a show of strength and political might. As a result, militarization of crime and political conflict are emerging as serious and potentially irreversible threats.

In recent years, there has been a growing tendency within the activist and scholarly communities to treat major conventional weapons and small arms as well as light weapons as distinct areas of policy formulation and study. An estimate of the global value of small arms production in 2002 is $7. 4 billion. Well over 1,000 companies manufacture light weapons and ammunition in nearly hundred countries. Controlling production of both light and major conventional weapons has historically been very difficult, because of lack of political will and economic pressures from manufacturers.

The main focus with respect to illegal weapons proliferation in Pakistan remains in the unorganized private enterprise at Darra and Landi Kotal where the arms trade continues without any state hindrance. Besides this, the organized sector manufacturers are also bound to sell their products to licensed gun owners is not more than approximately 80,000-90,000 in the country. This makes the legal market a very small one, which is adequately served by the private producers. However, recent trends indicate that the estimated number of weapons in circulation is much higher than tabulated. The rising ethno-sectarian strife, civil war in Afghanistan, and an enhanced sense of insecurity arising out of factors such as poor economic conditions, bad governance and the deteriorating law-and-order situation have raised the level of frustration and discontent. It is witnessed that the rising sense of apathy and social injustice has strengthened the appeal of small arms and light weapons. Darra and its cheaper rates attracts not only NSAs who purchase these weapons in bulk, but also a second category of buyers, such as officials, low-enforcing agents, influential politicians, and feudal and tribal lords who regard the posses session of light weapons as a status symbol. Moreover, the various governments too have exacerbated this situation by giving licenses for prohibited bore weapons to politicians and influentional people to win political favour, or in pursuit of their vested interests in arming one (ethnic/sectarian) group against another from time to time.

The principal source of weapons proliferation and supply to arms of regional and domestic conflict, the unorganized sector, has a minimal manufacturing capacity of a hundred weapons per day. With the very sudden and dramatic termination of the Afghan conflict, the governments following Zia Ulaq’s proved to be ineffective in solving this menace. Although attempts were made in the past, and are being made presently, too, to curb the proliferation and the indiscriminate use of small arms, they are very much an indicator of a dysfunctional state apparatus.

In Pakistan, the failure of governance-especially with regard to narcotics production and smuggling-and the country’s proximity to Afghanistan and its involvement in the attempts to end Soviet occupation of the country have combined to intensity an already dire law-and-order situation. In many cases, access to light weapons has facilitated or intensified conflicts, often by emboldening the protagonists. Consequently, the ability the increased firepower enjoyed by the forces pitched against them.

Second in line are the private manufacturers who operate and produce certain non-prohibited bore are limited in number and are concentrated mainly in the province of Punjab and Karachi. These private entrepreneurs are forced to continue with the production of the same items, whether or not they have market demand, because of the licensing requirements. This proves to be extremely cost-intensive efforts, and in a bid to cover production costs as well as maintain a reasonable profit level, these manufactures not only use substandard material, but are also involved in unauthorized manufacturing.

With respect to the scope of the term ‘illicit trade’, one should consider the illicit manufacture, acquisition, possession, use, and storage of small arms and light weapons, since these are closely linked to transfers of such weapons. The illicit trade in small arms and light weapons is closely related to the excessive and destabilizing accumulation and transfer of such arms and should, therefore, not be limited to criminal breaches of existing arms legislation and export/import controls, but consideration should be to all relevant factors. With regard to the manufacture, production, and sale of light weapons, we can divide the domestic producers of SA/LW in Pakistan into three broad categories:

1. The state-owned or public sector enterprise
2. Private manufacturers(operating under state license and regulation)
3. The Darra Bara/gun cottage industry (which is not under any state supervision)

State-Owned/ Public Enterprise:

This primarily constitutes about 14 public sector manufacturing enterprise at the Pak . Ordanance Factories (POF), Wah. The variety of weapons manufactured in these factories includes Heckler and Koch MP-5, G-3, A-3, MPSA-2 guns, Anti-tank light weapons, ammunition and anti-personnel land mines. All of these items are produced under license with a very stringent control mechanism and maintenance of complete record. The items thus produced are not only ISO9001 certified, but also come under strict export regulations under the government’s Statutory Regulatory Order (SRO-123/124 OF February 1998). Carrying out correct marketing procedure and purchase enumeration both at the receiving and purchasing end is also properly overseen. Besides the POF, items such as anti-tank systems and ammunition, anti-personnel and anti-tank landmines, explosive devices, multi-barrel rocket launchers etc. are manufactured at the Kahuta Research Lab (KRL), an independent entity under state control.

The POF was made a public-sector enterprise in the early 1980’s by redesigning the Head of POF as “Chairman” and instituting a “Board of Directors”, As part of its new states the POF has also been given the authority to engage in profit-making activities, but in spite of that, its principal and largest client remains the Pakistan military with new weapons, these ordanance factories hold reserve stocks and repair facilities for the normal wear and tear.

From the entire gun manufacturing facilities, POF remains the only outfit, which is allowed to export its products. These exports include anti-tank ammunition as well as infantry equipment and the sales also cater to the domestic market but in a very limited manner. Although very stringent regulations are in place on the production and scale of weapons to state actors alone, there are reported incidents where weapons seized from low-intensity zones could be traced back to the POF.

As mentioned above, the criterion of revenue generation is not of great importance to this case. It should be noted that due to low demand, which has the full capacity of POF were not used properly. Agriculture, factories produce only what most customers, the Pakistani military, which is of course entirely within the annual production capacity is the best ammunition that is not V & # xE4; Less than U.S. $ 70,000,000 to be restricted.

Private Manufacturers:

Second in line are the private manufacturers who operate and produce certain non-prohibited bore weapons under license. The organized legal arms manufacturers are limited in number, and are concentrated mainly in the province of Punjab and Karachi. Although the licensing requirements restrict the manufacturers from producing anything other than the exact configurations of the armaments, the main incentive or motivate or motivation for the private enterprises is to generate profit task that has become increasingly difficult in the restricted business environment where the one hand these guns manufacturers are constrained by license regulations and on the other they are provided with no incentives and are also heavily taxed by the government

These private entrepreneurs are forced to continue with the production of the same items whether or not they have any market demand, because of the licensing requirements. This proves to be extremely cost-intensive effort and in a bid to cover production cost as well as to maintain a proportionate profit level, these manufacturers not only use sub-standard material but they are also involved in unauthorized manufacturing. Accordingly, in many cities there are few or no licensed manufacturers, but there can be found many dealership and repair license holders, for it has a better money generation scope. The end-users in this regard are usually sub-state sectors or outfits which purchase these items for coercive activities.

The Darra Bara or Gun-Making Industry:

The arms bazaars of Darra Adamhel and Landi Kotal in the North West Frontier Province of Pakistan are famous for the production of light weapons for centuries. Both are colonial as well as Cold War legacy, these traditional grey areas gained increased salience, after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. However, the illicit gunsmiths of India are poor cousins when compared to those of DAK. Darra is the heart of Pakistan’s notorious arms bazaar, and it is here that one can acquire practically any small arm at a low cost: Kalashnikovs, M-16S, Uzis, and even guns hidden in walking sticks and ballpoint pens. Some are originals left over from the war in Afghanistan; others are copies made in back-alley workshops, repaired originals, or copies made from cannibalized parts. Often the only difference between the original and are made from inferior quality metal. Original AK-47s sell for about US $320, but an identical copy starts at US $50.

The Darra gunsmiths are famous for their skills and expertise, which have been passed down from father to son for generations, and they are known for their ability to produce any kind of weapon in Spartan conditions. Although these artisans do not have any formal technical training, they have inherited the skills and have the ability to copy and make almost any kind of light weapon. Before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, they produced mainly rifles and shotguns in addition to a wide range of pistols. Now they are adept at producing exact copies of any light weapon desired in a matter of days. They have been known to make imitation Chinese laser-sight pistols and Japanese pen pistols down to the finest detail. Some of Darra’s older craftsmen have also invented their own designs; for example a shotgun that works like a revolver, with a chamber holding six shells. Unlike the previous two categories of gun manufacturers, the Darra gunsmiths base their business on demand and supply and are acutely aware of the prevalent market trends and demand factors.

At one time they supplied the Afghan mujahideen in their struggle against Soviet occupation. Now they are the main suppliers of guns to Kashmir and to Pakistan’s troubled provinces of Punjab and Sind. Darra ’s shops and factories offer home delivery any where in the country, and are known to have also sold arms to guerrillas from Northern Ireland and the Middle East.

Both a colonial as well as Cold War legacy, these traditional grey areas gained increased salience after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. This brought a new dimension to light weapons manufacture and production in this area-the unabated and immeasurable proliferation and inflow of illicit and illegal arms. Before the Soviet incursion, Darra used to produce mainly 9mm. rifles, shotguns and pistols ranging from 0. 22 to 0. 32 caliber, etc. The Darra manufacturers are now adept at producing very exact copies of kalashnikovs, bazookas, and even rocket launchers.

An important characteristic of Darra and its various manufacturing units is that it is an unorganized enterprise, free from any state licensing, regulation and tax requirements. It is a part of the NWFP’ s tribal belt where no formal state law has been accepted or applied, and the tribal authority, better known as the jirga ,mediates and enforces justice, law and order . The government also cannot do much about the production sale of weapons here, because the state laws do not have jurisdiction over the tribal areas-even the British couldn’t establish their writ here. The government can only check the in-country movement of arms from this area, which is indeed a very challenging task.

Arms purchasers are attracted to the Darra because the manufacturing cost of weapons made here is relatively low compared to the state-regulated gun making sectors and the ready availability of a wide variety of weapons with so much pilferage taking place across the border. There is also found in this primitive gun-making cottage industry gunsmiths carrying out innovative changes which are not possible without a certain level of expertise. These arms bazaars of Pakistan are perhaps the best-known example of small-scale production of small arms . Hundreds of one-room operation manufacture copies of AK-47s and other rifles and pistols. Individual craftsmen manufacture small numbers of weapons, with a pistol taking three days to produce and an AK-47 between seven and ten days . But because there are many hundreds of such arms sellers, the overall production figures run into thousands of weapons

Small Arms Trade and Manufacture in Pakistan:

If the South-East Asia, particularly Pakistan, to some very interesting aspects to come out. Source of acquisition and had an infinite supply of arms: illegal immigration, transfer or sale of local production. Several countries in the region produce SA / LW Government-owned or public companies are regulated by the proposed legislation, India and Pakistan, the most modern weapons tootmisvõ ; imsus. But if such an acquisition of the LW’s national security forces continue to import or foreign technology.

Although LW have somewhat always been available in the arms bazaars within the North West Frontier Province of Pakistan, such as Darra Adamkhel and Landi Kotal, the major impetus and free flow of modern light weapons has increased manifold after the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. The December 1979 Soviet invasion resulted in Pakistan’s proactive support to various Mujahideen outfits engaged in fighting the occupationist forces. This effort was practically driven by its own security interest but mainly on behalf of the US, which provided material and financial assistance to these Afghan guerrillas though Pakistan. The failure or ignorance of the incumbent government of the time to pay adequate attention to this dangerously spiraling trend of weapons accumulation and free flow in the hands of non-state actors aggravated this problem. In spite of the cessation of Soviet occupation, Afghanistan to date remains bitterly embroiled in a civil war, which has cast very severe shadows on the Pakistani civil society.

Before moving further the point to be stressed that when studying weapons proliferation, an important aspect is to keep in perspective the demand and supply factor. The motives for which suppliers and recipients engage in weapons transaction may be mixed. Suppliers may have political or commercial incentives or a combination of both. For this reason, excessive and destabilizing accumulation and transfer of small arms are closely related to the increased incidence of conflicts and high level of crime and violence. It is observed that sub-state or non-state forces make extensive use of such arsenal due to its merits of easy accessibility, storage and handling. Insurgent forces, irregular troops and freedom fighters, criminal groups and sub-state actors harbouring ethnic, religious and sectarian agenda use SA/LW for their particular motives with impunity. Generally speaking the most perturbing aspect of these conflicts is that more than 80% of the causalities are civilian, non-combatants-mostly women and children.

Market Trends and Origins of Arms Proliferation in Pakistan: The main focus with respect to weapons proliferation in Pakistan remains on the unorganized private enterprise at the Landi Kotal, where arms trade continues without any state supervision. In comparison to this, the POF as mentioned earlier creates mainly the military-specific ammunition, the production cost of is relatively expensive. Secondly, the POF manufactured ammunition has a very limited and restricted clientele. Another contributing factor is that POF sells only through designated distributors.

Secondly, the organized sector manufacturers are also bound to sell their products only to licensed buyers. This again limits their sale capacity. The overall number of licensed gun owners is not more than 80,000-90,000 people of the entire country’s population. This makes the legal market a very small one, which is adequately served by the private producers

But recent trends indicate that the estimated number of weapons in circulation is much higher than tabulated. The rising ethno-sectarian strife, civil war in Afghanistan, and an enhanced sense of insecurity arising out of factors such as poor economic conditions, bad governance and deteriorating law and order situation, have given rise to a level of frustration and discontent. It is witnessed that this rising sense of apathy and social injustice has strengthened the appeal of SA/LW. Darra and its cheaper rates attract not only non-state actors, who purchase these weapons in bulk, but also a second category of buyers, such as officials, aw enforcing agents, influential politicians, feudal and tribal lords who regard possession of light weapons as a status symbol. Moreover the various governments too have contributed to exacerbating this situation by giving licenses for prohibited bore weapons to politicians and influential interest arming one (ethnic/sectarian) group against another from time to time.

A principal source of weapons proliferation and supply to areas of regional and domestic conflict, the unorganized sector has a minimal manufacturing capacity of producing per unit a hundred weapons per day . With a very sudden and dramatic termination of the Afghan conflict, the political governments after Zia’s military rule proved to be ineffective in solving this menace. Although attempts were made in the past and present to curb the proliferation and indiscriminate usage of small arms, they are very much an indicator of a dysfunctional state apparatus.

In Pakistan, the failure of governance-especially with regard to narcotics production and smuggling-coupled with the country’s proximity to Afghanistan and involvement in the attempts to end the Soviet occupation of the country, has aggravated an already dire law-and-order situation. In many cases, access to light weapons has facilitated or intensified conflicts, often by emboldening the protagonists. Consequently, the ability of security forces has declined corresponding with the increased firepower enjoyed by the forces pitted against them. As regards the leakage of these illicit arms, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan unshared in a new era in the light weapons trade in South Asia, with millions of tons of military material including SA/LW, being imported into the region.

Other countries also contributed in one way or indirect assistance in both material and finances. For example, China wary of Soviet designs contributed weaponary, while Saudi Arabia came forth with financial assistance. As a front line ally, Pakistan became the main conduit for this massive military assistance programme, with its top intelligence outfit, inter-services intelligence (ISI), managing the receipt and distribution and the American CIA coordinating the supply of weapons. With a bitter Vietnam experience still fresh in memory, the United States, at least initially, did not want to be seen as providing direct military assistance for the Mujahideen, and for these reason massive amounts of arms were purchased from the Chinese government. Interesting trends could be witnessed in this undercover arms pipeline; the CIA would procure through Egypt large amounts of antipersonnel mines originally produced in Italy. During this period, weapons even of Israeli and as Indian makes could also be found in circulation. The CIA would then arrange for the arms to be either flown to Islamabad or shipped, via Oman, to Karachi.

The US-orchestrated arms shipments had a fundamental impact on the war in Afghanistan. Moreover, the autonomy given to the Pakistan intelligence services in controlling the distribution of weapons was to have a profound effect on subsequent security conditions in the region. Washington’s “hand-off” policy of allowing the ISI to control the arms pipeline was largely the product of Oakley’s belief that the United States had failed in Vietnam because of excessive governmental interference and mismanagement.

One factor contributing to the availability of small arms and light weapons in many areas (of conflict) is their earlier supply by Cold War opponents. Much of the supply and acquisitions of arms in the regions of conflict dealt with by the UN has been conducted by Governments or by legal entities authorized by the Governments. Some states have exercised insufficient control and restraint over transfers and holdings of small arms and light weapons. Moreover, arms supplies associated with foreign interference in areas of conflict are still a feature of current realities. In general, the lines of supply often are complex and difficult to monitor, facilitated by the relative ease with which small arms and light weapons can be concealed.

Not surprisingly, the arms pipeline to the Mujahideen leaked significantly. By the time the weapons reached Mujahideen field commanders, they had been loaded and off-loaded at least fifteen times while transported over the distance of several thousand kilometers by trucks, ships, trains, and pack animals. How many weapons leaked out of the pipeline is unknown, but the estimates run into millions of unaccounted for weapons. One glaring proof of this is the April1988 Ojhri camp blast in the Rawalpindi metropolis, which claimed not less than 100 civilan lives. Although no official version of the inquiry conducted came out, it is generally speculated that the blast was engineered to cover-up for the undelivered and hoarded weapons, and there is also a major link between this incident and the Iran Contra scandal.

Another contributing factor, however diminutive is that Afghans returning to their country after months or years in the refugee camps in the North West Frontier Province have left their weapons behind in Pakistan. This again forms a cause for weapons proliferation. Under the Geneva Accord, it was agreed that any surplus weapons that were left off the pipeline would be handed over to the Afghans, and interestingly there was a frantic arms transfer to Afghanistan, before the agreement came into effect. Most of these were smuggled back into Pakistan and sold in arms bazaars of the tribal area.

Besides, Afghanistan has a significant number of small arms manufacturing units. The trade of these arms is a ready source of income for the war-ravaged Afghan population. With a long porous border that stretches the entire Pakistan-Afghanistan belt, coupled with corrupt and inefficient border control forces, the mechanism fails miserably in effectively checking and curbing the inflow of not only weapons but other forms of smuggling as well. This has made the availability of arms in the commercial market considerably high and in some cases prices have fallen, attracting buyers from all over the country and region to purchase unlicensed weapons. The various weapons on sale in this regard, can be grouped in to four categories;

1. Weapons that lecked from the US-supported arms pipelines.
2. The stocks of Soviet weapons captured by the Mujahideen during the conflict.
3. The third category of weapons is those manufactured by small-scale producers within the region.
4. Finally, the arms bazaars of the NWFP are full of miscellaneous weapons that must have arrived in the region though extremely circuitous and unpredictable routes-from Vietnam or the Middle East. For instance, G-3s have appeared from Iran, given that border controls between Iran and Pakistan were relaxed after the fall of the shah.

Though there is clear evidence that light weapons are proliferating at an alarming rate from the North to the South, there are also south-to-north movements from Sri Lanka, Singapore, and other starting points in Southeast Asia. There are also discernible east-to west and west-to east movements.

In Pakistan, it is not only the Afghan crisis alone that was instrumental in introducing the Gun Culture. Another very important but relatively ignored aspect was the Baluchistan insurgency of the 1970s, that witnessed a massive inflow of weaponry from the traditional leakage points

There is a dire need for the government to take control of the drug trade and prevent the proliferation and flow of weapons, domestically, regionally and particularly with the help of the international community. What will be difficult, if not impossible to implement is an effective gun control agenda-such as the present regime’s Seven-Stage De-Weaponization Programmes. This 7- stage formula includes a ban on arms license, and a proliferation on carrying weapons in the first stage, which became effective from March 1, 2000. The other proposals or possibilities under the same action plan were to recover illicit/unlicensed arms, canceling of the prohibited arms licenses and also to regulate and bring under state control arms manufacturing units in the tribal areas. The problem is so acute that there is a need to implement such policies and reforms in their true spirit. Bringing Darra under the state umbrella is an issue that the governments past and present have seriously deliberated upon. As a necessary first step the tribal areas were awarded with the right to Adult Franchise as well, but the possibility of Darra manufacturers agreeing to any state supervision or taxation seems impossible an evidence of which is reaction faced by the government over its attempt to document and evaluate the economy. The government needs to stick to a given time frame and implement the necessary reforms, otherwise the situation could be one as identified by Pamela Constable, in one of her recent Washington post articles, “Pakistani Retreats in Battle for Reform”- that there is found a tendency on part of the Pakistani government to announce bold reforms, only to backtrack later when opposition surfaces.

At the practical level, this new de-weaponisation policy will face many problems, especially in the NWFP and tribal areas where it is part of local culture and tradition to carry a weapon and in fact it also forms a part of their attire. This plan will definitely discourage open display of weapons in major urban centers, but again this will not be able to redress the problem fully.

Efforts of recent governments have been articulated for them is true or not the actual causes of the problem involved in illegal arms trade is inadequate. Regardless of the measures to give effect to the producers affected by trafficking cartels free hand to run their business with impunity.

Although light weapons have always circulated within Pakistan, the impact of the American-sponsored arms pipeline to the Afghan Mujahideen stands head and shoulders above any other adverse development in recent years. The flood of weaponry into the region has clearly played a major part in the erosion of low and order over the past decade. The growing proliferation of and access to small arms are increasing both the communal polarization and the incidence of violence. The very availability of weapons is providing a short-term solution for a long-term problem. At the very point when political discourse and sound governance are required to overcome these problems, the need is to harness our efforts together to combat this menace.

Multiple attacks rock Balochistan on eve of Aug 14

Three policemen killed in check post ambush; BLA claims responsibility

QUETTA: On the eve of Pakistan’s Independence Day, which Baloch insurgents celebrate as a ‘black day’, Balochistan was rocked by multiple attacks, spreading immense panic across the province.

There were at least three rocket attacks and a deadly assault on a police check post in Quetta, as well as explosions in Gwadar, Mastung, Khuzdar and Hub.

The Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) has claimed the responsibility for the attack on the police check post in Quetta, in which three police personnel were killed.

Calling from an unspecified location, a man, Jehind Baloch, who introduced himself as a spokesman for the BLA, claimed responsibility for the assault, saying that it was a reaction to a statement by the Quetta police chief, as well as the continuous recovery of bullet-riddled bodies of allegedly those who had been kept in illegal detention by government functionaries. The spokesman also claimed responsibility for a grenade attack in Hub. He warned that the organisation would carry out more attacks.

Meanwhile, of the three rocket attacks in Quetta, one injured a constable of the Balochistan Constabulary and a boy, another damaged buildings while a third rocket did not explode.

The first rocket landed in Masoom Shah Street close to the residence of Provincial Home Secretary Akbar Hussein Durrani, which is next to the chief minister’s secretariat. A constable identified as Lal Mohamad and a six-year-old passerby Mohammad Umer suffered splinter wounds and were taken to Provincial Sandeman Hospital Quetta for treatment.

The second rocket hit a house on Prince Road. The house of Haji Mujeeb was partially damaged, while the window-panes of nearby buildings and hotels were also shattered due to the impact of the blast.

The third rocket landed in Imambargah Jaffria on McCanghey Road but fortunately it did not explode on impact. The Bomb Disposal Squad rushed to the site and managed to defuse it in time.

Separately, two explosions took place in Gwadar, partially damaging the offices of the deputy commissioner and Radio Pakistan in each instance.

According to reports reaching here, unidentified men hurled a cracker at the deputy commissioner’s office on Airport Road, which exploded outside injuring two passersby. The injured were taken to a government hospital for treatment. One of the injured was identified as Allah Dad and the identity of the other could not be ascertained. Another blast occurred outside Radio Pakistan damaging its outer wall. No casualty was reported in the blast. The frequent blasts caused panic among the people of Gwadar and security was raised immediately.

In Khuzdar, unidentified assailants placed explosive material near Government Model High School. Another device was placed outside the deputy commissioner’s office in Awaran. However no casualty was reported in either blast.

In Mastung, the residence of doctor was attacked with a hand grenade, which shattered the glass of the structure as well as surrounding installations. However no casualty was reported. Doctor Noorul Haq is deputed in Civil Hospital Kalat.

The assault on the police check post in Quetta took place near the Chaki Shawani area on Saryab Road on Friday. According to an official source, three policemen were manning the post when it was attacked.

The assailants also took away the official arms of the dead policemen. The bodies were taken to the Bolan Medical Complex where they were identified as Abdul Saleem, Ghulam Sarwar and Nasruddin. The policemen were on special guard duty on the eve of August 14.

“I had told all policemen earlier to remain alert because target killers could carry out attacks any time,” Quetta police chief Ghulam Shabbir Sheikh told journalists.

Baloch Liberation Army claims responsibility for attacks on Punjabis in Balochistan

The Baloch Liberation Army (BLA), a separatist group, has claimed responsibility for the killing of 16 Punjabi-origin people in ethnic violence in the insurgency-hit southwestern Balochistan province of Pakistan.

The BLA said it attacked the settlers from Punjab in two separate incidents in Balochistan's provincial capital Quetta and on its outskirts yesterday in retaliation against the "killing of missing persons in custody of government."

The latest incidents of ethnic violence have raised concerns among authorities about the growing unrest in Balochistan.

"Armed men hijacked a passenger coach coming from Lahoreto Quetta in the Bolan district and kidnapped 10 men, all of whom belonged to Punjab," a police official said.

"The 10 men were later gunned down in cold blood. Six others, all of them labourers, had been killed in a targeted killing in the city in the Khilji colony," he said.

Separatists have carried out several attacks on government and security installations in the last few months as they stepped up their violent campaign in Balochstan.

In recent months, they had targeted settlers in the province, forcing many of them to flee.

They had also attacked teachers and professors belonging to other provinces who were working in different educational institutions in Quetta, raising concerns about the safety of the settlers.

Recent media reports claimed that some parts of Quetta and other areas of the province had virtually become no-go zones for the law enforcement agencies and settlers.

The government has also faced major issues in the province of Sindh, particularly Karachi, where around 90 people were killed in a week following the outbreak of violence after a leader of the MQM was assassinated by unknown gunmen in a mosque on August 2.